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AN INTRODUCTORY EXAMINATION OF THE
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 19701 was enacted to help
eradicate organized crime2 in the United States by providing law en-
forcement officials with sharper legal tools for gathering evidence, new
substantive criminal prohibitions, more effective sanctions, and other novel
remedies for unlawful activity.' One of the substantive provisions of the
Organized Crime Control Act is Title IX,' which amends Title 18 of the
United States Code by adding Chapter 96, entitled "Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations" (hereinafter RICO).' RICO was originally
conceived as a remedy for organized crime infiltration and control of legiti-
mate business.' However, since its enactment RICO has been criticized
because it has been used as a weapon by the federal government to reach
not only the legitimate business and illegitimate activities of organized
crime but also white-collar crime unrelated to organized crime.'
' Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.). See
generally McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act (S.30) or its Critics: Which Threat-
ens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970-1971) and Note, Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 546 (1971) for discussions of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.
2 Examination of the legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act shows Congress
used the term "organized crime" to refer to the ethnic criminal association popularly known
as the "Mafia" or "Cosa Nostra", see infra notes 28-47. For a concise bibliography of Con-
gressional inquiries into "organized crime" activities, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena of
Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 46-49 (2d Cir. 1975). For background reading on ethnic concepts
of organized crime, see generally D. CREsSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION: THE STRUCTURE AND
OPERATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA (1969); F. IANNI, BLACK MAFIA: ETHNIC
SUCCESSION IN ORGANIZED CRIME (1974); E. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951); P.
MASS, THE VALACHI PAPERS (1968); R. SALERNO & J. TOMPKINS, THE CRIME CONFEDER-
ATION: COSA NOSTRA AND ALLIED OPERATIONS IN ORGANIZED CRIME (1969); THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED
CRIME (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME].
3 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. Congressional
Statement of Findings and Purpose, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976).
4 Id. at §§ 1961-1968.
5 Id.
6 See in! ra notes 23-47 and accompanying text for legislative history of RICO; McClellan,
supra note 1, at 140-46 (indicating Cosa Nostra infiltration of legitimate business was RICO's
intended target).
7 Several sources, including defense attorneys, commentators, and the courts have criticized
RICO because of its severe penalties and broad coverage. See, e.g., A.B.A. SECTION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF RICO AND MAIL FRAUD CASES 25-35
(1980) (copies available from A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section); Blakey & Gettings, Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil
Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1012 n.13 (1980); Special Project, White-Collar Crime: A
Survey of Law, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), 18 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 308, 309 nn.1180 & 1181 (1980-1981); Special Project, White-Collar Crime: Second
Annual Survey of Law, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 351, 353 n.1413 (1981).
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This metamorphosis into a weapon against white-collar crime and
illicit business activity was possible because of RICO's unique provisions.'
RICO was designed not only to prosecute the individuals involved, but
also to strike at the business or enterprise.' To accomplish its objective
RICO creates new criminal offenses and remedies," 9 but does not crimin-
alize previously innocent conduct. The crucial elements of a RICO offense
are the proof of a "pattern of racketeering activity"" coupled with an
existing "enterprise"." "Enterprise" is a broad concept under RICO, and
can be defined to include many diverse entities, including wholly illicit
associations.' A "pattern of racketeering activity" exists if there is a vio-
lation of any two or more enumerated existing state or federal offenses.'
RICO creates substantive offenses even though not complete and inde-
pendent of other offenses, 5 because its provisions create duties and obliga-
tions in addition to those created by the predicate offenses on which it
relies. 6 It is this reliance on the commission of these predicate offenses
8 For a critical view of these unique provisions, see, e.g., Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal
Statutes, 69 J. CRiM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 1 (1978); Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the
Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REV. 837 (1980); Tarlow, RICO: The New
Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980); Comment, Title IX
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising in Its Inter-
pretation, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 89 (1977); Note, United States v. Sutton: The Sixth Circuit
Curbs Abuse of RICO, The Federal Racketeering Enterprise Statute, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 629
(1979); Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather Than the
Statute Itself?, 55 NoTRE DAME LAW. 777 (1980); Note, The Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act: An Analysis of the Confusion in Its Application and a Proposal for
Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1980).
9 The purpose of RICO is to "deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic
base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic
well-being of the Nation." United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 392 (2d Cir. 1979)
(quoting S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
10 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (1976).
1I Id. at § 1961(5) states that "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and
the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
12 Id. at § 1961(4) states that " 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity."
'3 See infra notes 137-52 and accompanying text for a disccussion of the breadth and scope
of a RICO enterprise.
14 "Racketeering activity," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978, Supp.
III (1979), includes state felony offenses (enumerated by their generic name) and specific
federal offenses. Section 1961()(B) was amended by the Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-575, sec. 3(c), 92 Stat. 2465, to include trafficking in contraband cigarettes, and
§ 1961(1)(C) was amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
title III, sec. 314(g), 92 Stat. 2677 to include fraud connected with a case under title 11-
(bankruptcy).
2 5 A substitute offense is "complete of itself and not dependent upon another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1281 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
18 RICO's criminal offenses are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
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(offenses not exclusively restricted by their definitions" to commission by
traditional organized crime groups' 8) that, in conjunction with the broad
"enterprise" concept, enables prosecutors to apply RICO to many diverse
types of organized and white-collar crime.' 9 Recognition of RICO's adapt-
ability and usefulness has not escaped the notice of state legislatures, several
of which have enacted statutes modeled on RICO's provisions.20
This comment will attempt to serve as an introduction to RICO,
addressed to those with little or no knowledge of either its provisions and
intricacies, or its potential usefulness and adaptability as a prosecution
tool. The recent criticism of RICO by the American Bar Association2'
will also be reviewed, as well as the ABA's proposed amendments to RICO.'
Finally, the state RICO statutes will be discussed. The advantages they
offer states currently without any substantive laws dealing directly and
primarily with organized and white-collar crime will be examined.
17 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l) (1976 & Supp. H 1978, Supp. 11 1979).
18 See supra note 2 and its reference to the meaning of "organized crime."
19 For examples of RICO's adaptability for use in prosecuting persons and reaching ac-
tivities unconnected to traditional concepts of organized crime, see, e.g., United States
v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981) (judge of El Paso, Texas Municipal Court
manipulated court docket and collected fees, along with several other persons, in exchange
for favorable disposition of traffic citations); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th
Cir. 1981) (individuals engaged in arson-for-profit and murder); United States v. Grapp,
653 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1981) (computer consulting company involved in intricate mail and
wire fraud scheme); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981) (Florida state
judge, court employees, and attorneys engaged in bribery, manipulation of grand juries, pro-
tection of illegal activities, and threats against prospective witnesses); United States v.
Long, 651 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1981) (South Carolina state senator and other senate em-
ployees accepting bribes in exchange for state jobs); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d
535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 734 (1980) (individuals associated in fact to
commit robbery and murder-for-hire); United States v. Forsythe, 594 F.2d 947 (3d Cir.
1979) (Allegheny County, Pa. magistrate and local bail bond agency engaged in bond fixing
and referral kickback scheme); United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978) (father and son engaged with others in arson-for-profit scheme);
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hawkins v. United
States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (group involved in automobile theft, fencing stolen property,
and murder).20 Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2312 to -2315 (1978 & Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
895.01 to .06 (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3401 to -3408 (Supp. 1981);
HAwArI REv. STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7801 to 18-7805 (Supp.
1981); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1 to -2 (Burns Supp. 1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
911 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (Supp. 1980).
21 The Criminal Justice Section of the A.B.A. has a committee on RICO. The Criminal
Justice Section Council recently approved a report of this committee recommending amend-
ments to RICO. This report has been submitted and will be considered by the A.B.A.
House of Delegates at the next meeting. If approved it will become official A.B.A. policy.
Interestingly, the A.B.A. was in favor of RICO initially, recommending only minor amend-
ments to Congress at the time of RICO's consideration. See Organized Crime Control:
Hearings on S.30 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 537, 543-44, 548-51 (1970) (statement of Edward L. Wright, President-
Elect, A.B.A.) [hereinafter cited as Organized Crime Control Hearings].
22 A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice, Report to House of Delegates, Recommendations for
Amending Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, (January 1982) (un-
published report) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Justice Section Report].
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II. RICO's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The genesis of RICO is found in two Senate bills, S. 20483 and S.
2049,24 introduced in 1967 by Senator Hruska25 for use in fighting the in-
filtration and control of legitimate business by organized crime." These
two bills proposed to combat organized crime through the use of antitrust
law concepts and techniques, and the amendment of existing antitrust stat-
utes. Neither bill, however, was reported out of committee, thus both per-
ished with the adjournment of the 90th Congress. 7
On January 15, 1969, shortly after the start of the 91st Congress,
Senator McClellan introduced S. 30, the Organized Crime Control Act of
1969.28 S. 30 attempted to implement some of the recommendations of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, 9 as well as providing other significant new tools to battle organized
crime in America.3" As originally introduced S. 30 did not contain a
RICO provision."
On March 20, 1969, Senator Hruska introduced S. 1623, the Criminal
23 S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (the text of the bill is not reprinted in the Cong.
Rec. or Hearings). "[A bill] to amend [the] Sherman Act to prohibit the investment of
certain income in any business enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 113 Cong.
Rec. 18007 (1967).
24 S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (the text of the bill is not reprinted in the Cong.
Rec. or Hearings). "[A bill] to prohibit the investment of income derived from certain
criminal activities in any business enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce, and
for other purposes." 113 Cong. Rec. 18007 (1967).
25H.R. 11266, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (identical to S. 2048), and H.R. 11268, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (identical to S. 2049) were introduced in the House by Rep. Poff
of Virginia, 113 Cong. Rec. 17976 (1967) (the text of these bills are not reprinted in the Cong.
Rec. or Hearings).
2 6 See generally REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 2, at 4-5, for background reading
on this infiltration of business problem.
2 7 Concern about the uncertain impact of existing antitrust law precedent on the provisions
of S. 2048, as well as a desire to avoid commingling of criminal law enforcement goals
with goals of competition regulation, may explain the reluctance of Congress to pass either
S. 2048 or its companion bill S. 2049. For further discussion of these concerns, and of the
use of antitrust concepts against organized crime, see A.B.A. Section of. Antitrust Law,
Report on S. 2048 and S. 2049 (1967), 115 Cong. Rec. 6994-95 (1969), reprinted in
Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623,
S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 556-58 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Measures Relating to Organized Crime Hearings].
28S.30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 827, 829-32 (1969) (introduced by Sens.
McClellan, Hruska, and Ervin).
29 REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 2, at 16-24, compare with S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., supra note 28, Title I (Grand Jury), Title II (Immunity), Title IV (False Statements),
Title VI (Protected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses), and Title VIII (Special
Offender Sentencing).
3
oSee 115 Cong. Rec. 827-32 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan upon introduction of
S. 30), and id. at 5877-85 (subsequent discussion of S. 30).
81 S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 829-32 (1969), reprinted in Measures Relating
to Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 27, at 4-29.
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Activities Profits Act.32 This bill was a synthesis of S. 2048 and S. 2049,"3
still using antitrust concepts, but seeking to add them to Title 18 (Crimes
and Criminal Procedure) of the United States Code, instead of Title 15
(Commerce and Trade)." After several days of hearings Senator Hruska
joined Senator McClellan in introducing S. 1861, the Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act of 1969,'3 which was based on the concepts of S. 1623, but con-
tained broader and additional provisions. 6 Additional hearings were held
on S. 30, S. 1623, S. 1861, and related bills37 and it was decided to inte-
grate S. 1861 into S. 30 as Title IX (RICO).3 8 S. 30 was considered, 9
passed by the Senate, "° and sent to the House.' After hearings" S. 30 was
amended in committee," considered,4 and passed by the House. " Due
to time constraints imposed by the impending conclusion of the 91st Con-
gress, the Senate concurred in the House version of S. 30 without a con-
ference. 6 President Nixon signed the Organized Crime Control Act (in-
cluding RICO) into law on October 15, 1970.11
III. SYNOPSIS OF RICO's MAJOR PROVISIONS
RICO's four criminal prohibitions are set forth in section 1962."
Section 1962(a)"9 directly addresses infiltration and control of legitimate
32S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 6992, 6995-96 (1969), reprinted in
Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra note 27, at 34-35. See also 115 Cong. Rec.
6992-6996 (Sen. Hruska's remarks upon introduction of S. 1623).
33 115 Cong. Rec. 6992, 6994-95 (1969).
34S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 6992, 6995 (1969) compare with S. 2048,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) and S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
35S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 9512, 9568-71 (1969), reprinted in Meas-
ures Relating to Organized Crime, supra note 27, at 61-82.
36 Id.
37 Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra note 27.
38 Because of its broader provisions the Department of Justice preferred S. 1861 over S. 1623.
Id. at 404. See also S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969').
39 116 Cong. Rec. 575-607, 815, 819-856, 952-972 (1970).
40 S. 30 passed the Senate by a vote of 73-1 on Jan. 23, 1970. Id. at 972.
41/d. at 1103.
42 Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 21.
43 See H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007.
44 116 Cong. Rec. 35191-35217, 35287-35363 (1970).
45 The vote was 341 to 26 on October 7, 1970. Id. at 35363.
461d. at 36280-36296.
47 Id. at 37264.
48 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
49 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlaw-
ful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of sec-
tion 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part
of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or
the establishment of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
COMMENTSSpring, 1982]
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businesses by prohibiting their legal acquisition with illegally-derived funds."
Under section 1962(a), no person can use any income,51 or the proceeds
of any income,5" derived directly or indirectly 5 from a pattern of racket-
eering or any loan sharking activities in which such person participated
as a principal,5" in order to establish, operate, or acquire any interest in
50 But 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) may not be limited in application to only legitimate
businesses. The Supreme Court, in the only RICO case it has decided on the merits,
stated that although: "It is obvious that § 1962(a) and (b) address the infiltration by
organized crime of legitimate businesses . . . we cannot agree that these sections were
not also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or reinvesting in wholly illegal
enterprises and from acquiring through a pattern of racketeering activity wholly illegitimate
enterprises .. " United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2529 (1981).
5118 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976) states that, "'person' includes any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." One court has held that "[i]t
is clear from this definition that 'individual' is used differently from 'person' in the act to
connote a living person." United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125,
1131 (E.D. Va. 1981). This would seem to preclude a group of corporations from fitting
the enterprise definition under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976), as they could not
be a "group of individuals associated in fact" and their association may not fit within
other parts of § 1961(4). However, the Computer Sciences court seems to read the definition
too literally, for "includes" usually means that the list is illustrative and not exhaustive.
See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99-100
(1941); Highway & City Freight Drivers, Dockmen and Helpers Local Union No. 600
v. Gordon Trans., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978).
"Person" has been liberally construed to include diverse individuals and associations. See,
e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345
(1980); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
950 (1976).
52 The proof problems in tracing income are discussed at infra notes 57-59 and accom-
panying text. See generally Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Investing
Dirty Money].
53 One of the few reported decisions concerning a § 1962(a) prosecution said, regarding this
"directly or indirectly" language:
These words demonstrate that the statute contemplates situations in which racketeering
monies will not be directly or immediately employed to establish or operate inter-
state enterprise. Thus, the statute on its face does not require immediate or even direct
use of illicit income . . . .Nor does it even require that the actual income itself
be used or invested in an enterprise . . . the statute is satisfied if the proceeds from
such income are so used or invested. To require . . . a direct employment of illicit
income . .. as a practical matter, would render the statute ineffective against the use
of interim depositories, commingled funds, and other surrepticious accounting tech-
niques designed to create significant obstacles to the tracing of illicit income.
United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Investing Dirty
Money, supra note 52, at 1510-1514; Tarlow, supra note 8, at 183-84.
54 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976):
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
The ABA Section of Criminal Justice has found this provision to be troublesome when
it is read in conjunction with § 1962(a). It is unclear whether "participated in as a prin-
cipal" in § 1962(a) modifies both "pattern of racketeering" and "collection of an unlawful
debt," or only "collection of an unlawful debt." Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note
22, at 9. Other commentators have found the possibility of expanded liability resulting
from the ambiguity unsatisfactory. See Tarlow, supra note 8, at 184-85; Investing Dirty Mon-
ey, supra note 52, at 1496-97. The A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section recommends amend-
ing § 1962(a) to clarify that "participated as a principal" modifies both "pattern" and
"collection." Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 22, at 9.
[Vol. 15:4
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any enterprise whose affairs affect interstate or foreign commerce.55 While
the infiltration and control problem is directly addressed,5" the effectiveness
of section 1962(a) is blunted by a major proof problem inherent within
it. A key element of any prosecution for a violation of section 1962(a)
is proof of the influx of "dirty" money into the enterprise.57 Since the tracing
of illicit capital into the enterprise is itself a difficult task,58 and since it is
equally difficult to demonstrate a tracing of illicit capital into an enterprise
in open court, prosecutions under section 1962(a) are rare. 9
While section 1962(a) covers legal acquisitions with illegally-derived
funds, section 1962(b)"0 proscribes illegal takeovers through use of illegal
means. Section 1962(b) prohibits any person from using a pattern of
racketeering, or the collection of unlawful debt,6 to directly or indirectly
acquire or maintain an interest in, or control of, any enterprise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce." Thus, it covers illegal acquisition of an
enterprise through use of extortion, bribery, fraud, loan sharking, or other
racketeering acts." Unlike section 1962(a), there are no unusually diffi-
55 The prosecution must show that the enterprise, not the racketeering acts themselves, af-
fects commerce, but the nexus need only be slight to establish an affect on commerce. See,
e.g., United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-281); United States v. Barton, 647, F.2d 224, 233 (2d
Cir. 1981); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 8 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
5 6 See REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 2, at 4-5 for, background.
57 "It shall be unlawful . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such in-
come, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in ... any enterprise
which . . . [affects] interstate commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
58 For excellent discussions of this evidentiary horror, see Blakey & Goldstock, "On the
Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. Rv. 341, 356-57 (1980);
Tarlow, supra note 8, at 185-88; Investing Dirty Money, supra note 52, at 1510-14.
59 See, e.g., United States v. Grapp, 653 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mc-
Nary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp.
1125 (E.D. Va. 1981).
60 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
,61 "Unlawful debt" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976). Note that while a pattern of
racketeering activity is required, i.e., two or more acts, a single collection of an unlawful
debt is sufficient for an offense under § 1962(a)(b), or (c). See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SECTION, STRIKE FORCE 18, AN EXPLANATION OF THE
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS STATUTE 22-25 (4th ed.), reprinted
in A.B.A. SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF RICO AND MAIL
FRAUD CASES 37, 60-63 (1980). Also see, e.g., United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402 (6th
Cir.) cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. § 143 (1981); United States v. Groff, 643 F.2d 396 (6th Cir.)
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 121 (1981); United States v. Salinas, 564, F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied sub nom., 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
62 See supra note 55.
63 See supra note 50 for a statement by the Supreme Court regarding the scope of § 1962(b).
United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2529. The Court indicated § 1962(b) may not be
limited to takeovers of only legitimate businesses.
COMMENTS
7
Morris: RICO
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
AKRON LAW REVIEW
cult proof problems inherent within section 1962(b), so it is employed
more often than is section 1962(a)."
Section 1962(c)65 is really the heart of section 1962, and it is used
much more frequently than either 1962(a) or 1962(b).6 Section 1962(c)
proscribes the illegal use of an enterprise by prohibiting any employee or
any person associated with an enterprise from conducting or participating
directly or indirectly in the conduct of the enterprise "through" a pattern
of racketeering 7 or collection of unlawful debt. Because "enterprise" is
a broad concept, even including groups of individuals "associated in fact"
for a wholly illicit purpose,68 section 1962(c) can be used in prosecuting
a wide variety of white-collar, and other crime.
Interestingly, sections 1962(a)-(c) contain no mens rea requirement
beyond that necessary under each of the predicate offenses, and the few
federal courts that have addressed this issue are in disagreement over what
mens rea RICO requires.69 Interestingly, some of the state RICO statutes
include an element of scienter in addition to that contained within predicate
64 See, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
952 (1978); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
909 (1979); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975).
65 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 656 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Forszt,
655 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Porcaro, 648 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779
(8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 102 (1981); United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied
101 S. Ct. 3142 (1981); United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976).
67 For discussion of the requirement of a nexus between the pattern of racketeering and
the enterprises, see infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
68 Before the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981),
the circuits were in conflict over the scope of a RICO enterprise, and whether illicit associ-
ations were also included. This is discussed further at infra notes 137-152 and accompany-
ing text.
69As introduced S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969). Section 1962(a) of S. 1861, 115
Cong. Rec. 9512, 9568-71 (1969), required mens rea but this requirement disappeared in
later versions of RICO. Few federal courts have directly addressed the issue, and those
that have are not in agreement over the mens rea element. Compare United States v. Boylan,
620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 103 (1980), and United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3109 (1981) where
neither court required a scienter element beyond that required by the predicate offenses
with United States v. Palmer, 630 F.2d 192, 203-04 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
1520 (1981) which held that acts violating RICO must be voluntary, and so must be done
knowingly.
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offenses."0 The A.B.A. has recommended the addition of a scienter require-
ment to sections 1962(a)-(c) 7' because of the severity of the penalties
under RICO and traditional court aversion to strict liability offenses. The
federal courts' apparent lack of interest in this issue may be related to the
possible requirement of a nexus between the racketeering acts.
72
Finally, conspiracy to violate sections 1962(a), (b), or (c) is made
a separate substantive offense under section 1962(d)." Although common
elements and events may be present in a case, any section 1962(d) con-
spiracy charge is distinct from a charge under the general federal statute on
conspiracy."4 A RICO conspiracy is punishable to the same extent as the
other substantive offenses." Section 1962(d) introduced a novel concept
of "enterprise" into traditional conspiracy concepts which has been difficult
for the courts to apply. 6 The A.B.A.7 and some commentators 8 feel section
1962(d) creates the possibility of multiple punishment for essentially one
act and therefore should be repealed. 9 The issues surrounding section 1962
70 See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-2312(C) (1978 & Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.03(1)
(West Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (Burns Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
7-15-2 (Supp. 1980).
71 Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 22, at 9-10.
72 See infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
73 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976) states, "[iut shall be unlawful for any person to conspire
to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
7 4 See United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 236-38 (2d Cir. 1981). The general conspiracy
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), requires two or more persons to agree to commit some
offense, plus some overt act by one of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy.
Conviction can result in a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for up to five years, or
both.
75 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
76See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lee
Stoller Enterprises, Inc., 652 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stratton, 649
F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981): United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 857 (1981); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.) sub. nom., 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
77 Criminal Justice Section report, supra note 22, at 10-12.
78 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 876-88; Tarlow, supra note 8, at 245-57; Note, Elliott v.
United States: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO,
65 VA. L. REv. 109 (1979). But see Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 58, at 360-62.
79Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 22, at 10-11. The A.B.A. stated that the
possibility of multiple punishment for offenses which are essentially one act is the primary
reason that 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) (1976) should be repealed, and cited United States v.
Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1979) (en banc), which struck down consecutive sentences
for violations of §§ 1962(c) and (d) where the proofs in the record were identical as
illustrative of the multiple punishment problem created by § 1962(d). The A.B.A. also points
out that the proofs are often identical to §§ 1962(c) and (d) charges, therefore, § 1962
(d) adds nothing except a possible increase in sentence which is itself objectionable iq
these cases.
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(d) are diverse and too complex to permit proper examination in this
comment."0
Section 196381 provides the criminal penalties for section 1962 of-
fenses, and includes the extraordinary penalty of forfeiture. Under section
1963 (a) a violation of section 1962 can result in a fine of up to $25,000,
imprisonment for up to twenty-five years, or both. 2 One aspect of section
1963(a) and section 1962 not specifically addressed until recently is the
question of the definition of a RICO "unit of prosecution" (count)8 Does
this depend on the number of "enterprises" alleged, or on the number of
different "patterns of racketeering activity" proven? This will be examined
later."
Section 1963 (a) also mandates that offenders:
shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in,
security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind
affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has
established operated (sic), controlled, conducted, or participated in
the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.85
Courts construing section 1963(a) have found that criminal forfeiture is
mandatory, allowing the trial judge no discretion. This result has been
criticized, 7 and the A.B.A. recommends that section 1963 (a) be amended
to read "may have forfeited" in place of the current language. 8 The A.B.A.'s
and courts' concern about the "shall forfeit" language is based on two
grounds. First, in some cases the forfeiture could be so disproportionate
to the offense as to constitute a violation of the fifth and eighth amend-
ments.8 9 However, the statute could be constitutional if the judge had some
80 Compare United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981) with United States
v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., 439 U.S. 953 (1978),
for examples of one circuit's wrestling with RICO conspiracy; and then review United
States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980). See also supra note 78, for background
reading.
81 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
82 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
83See United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981).
84 See infra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
85 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(1) & (2) (1976) (emphasis added).
86 See United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 809-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 104
(1980). But see United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1312 (1980).
87 See Criminal Justice Section Report, note 22, at 14-16.
88 1d. at 14.
89See United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769-70 n.12 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v, Huber, 603 F2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. St.
1312 (1980).
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discretion to determine whether or not there was a forfeiture." Second,
there is the possible in terrorem effect that the provision may have on per-
sons charged under RICO.9 Also to be considered is the long-standing
American antipathy for criminal forfeiture penalties,92 which has been
evidenced by the courts narrow construction of section 1963 .1 A final
problem with section 1963 (a) found by the A.B.A. is the lack of a hearing
prior to forfeiture in cases where third parties assert interest in property
subject to forfeiture.9" The A.B.A. suggests that a hearing and trial by
jury be provided after conviction of the offender(s) but before any actual for-
feiture is ordered by the court. 5
Section 1963(b)9" gives the district courts power to issue restraining
orders, prohibitions, or whatever is necessary to insure that any property
subject to forfeiture under section 1963(a) remains reachable after con-
viction. The A.B.A. recommends that this section be amended to provide
a hearing under rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Pre-
trial attachment would be available in appropriate cases, while also in-
suring that the rights and interests of the accused are protected.98
Section 1964" contains the civil remedies available under RICO.
Although they include treble damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and other
attractive remedies from antitrust law,100 there have been few private suits
90 See Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 22, at 15.
91 Id. at 16. See also Taylor M, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963-RICO's Most Pow-
erful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 398 (1980).
92 The first prohibition of forfeiture as a penalty was contained in an act of the First
Congress, the Act of April 30, 1790, ch. IX, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (1790) (current version
at 18 U.S.C. §3563 (1976)). Other statutes provide for in rem forfeiture, see e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1082 (1976) (property connected with illegal gambling), and 49 U.S.C. § 782
(1976) (property used in connection with narcotics offenses). But forfeiture under 18
U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) is an in personam forfeiture, a type supposedly prohibited by §
3563. However, the question of whether § 1963(a) repeals § 3563 by implication, as
stated in S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969) is undecided at this time.
9 See e.g., United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 351 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1037-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 98 (1980); United
States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Huber,
603 F.2d 387, 396-97, (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1312 (1980); United States v.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140-42 (N.D. Ga. 1979). But see United States v. L'Hoste, 609
F.2d 796, 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 104 (1980).
9 4Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 22, at 16-20.
95Id. at 16.
-18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976).
97 Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 22, at 20. Note that Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 deals
with the issuing of injunctions, and the notice and hearing requirements to be followed.
9Id. The government could still obtain pre-trial attachment by demonstrating the need in
a hearing similar to the one required before an injunction is issued, and the accused would
use the hearing to rebut the government's case for forfeiture.
09 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
10OSee S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 80-81 (1969),
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brought under this section.1"' The civil remedies are distinct from the
criminal ones, but section 1964(d) "I contains a collateral estoppel provision
which allows civil litigants to use a prior criminal RICO conviction against
their civil opponent.
A final RICO provision of interest is one not codified in the United
States Code. Section 904(a) provides that "[t]he provisions of this title
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."'0 3 This
liberal construction clause has been cited to support expansions of criminal
liability,' and this has caused some criticism.' The A.B.A. wants the
section repealed, and many commentators agree,"0 6 believing the clause vio-
lates canons of construction and possibly the Due Process clause." 7
The sections discussed above are the salient features of RICO. Before
investigating more complex RICO issues, the constitutionality of its provis-
ions will be examined.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO RICO
Some of the attacks on RICO have focused on the constitutionality
of its enactment by Congress pursuant to the Commerce clause."0 8 RICO
incorporates several state crimes into its provisions (in effect also making
them federal offenses),"' and it has been argued this unduly interferes with
the separation of powers between the federal and state governments."0
However, the courts have recognized the power of Congress to "prohibit
activities made unlawful by state law which take place in or in any way affect
interstate commerce without disturbing the delicate state and federal re-
101 For a good analysis of the RICO civil action and the cases brought under it, see Long,
Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and
Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DIcK L. REV. 201 (1981); Comment,
Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal
Activity" 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1975).
102 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1976). See generally Blakey & Gettings, supra note 7, at 1044-46.
,03 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922 (1970).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 1312 (1980); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United
States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
105 See Tarlow, supra note 8, at 177-80. But see Blakey & Gettings, supra note 7, at 1031-
33.
106 See Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 22, at 12-14.
107 Id.
108 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See generally Comment, The Scope of Federal Criminal Juris-
diction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 805.
9 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1976).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir. 1981).
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lationship,""' and have not recognized challenges to RICO based on fed-
eralism.1"
Despite the amount of litigation over the meaning of some RICO prov-
isions, notably the elements of "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering,""11
courts have not found RICO violative of the Due Process clause "14 due to
vagueness" 5 or as a status offense."
Claims that RICO is violative of the Double Jeopardy clause", have
also been rejected. When state crimes comprise the predicate offenses used
to establish a pattern of racketeering under RICO, the "dual sovereignty"
doctrine, that the Double Jeopardy clause does not prohibit prosecution
of an individual by different sovereignties where the same criminal acts
constitute a separate offense against each sovereignty, has been utilized
to dismiss double jeopardy claims against RICO." When federal offenses
MllUnited States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Accord United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
112 See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cap-
petto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v.
Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979) af'd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
113 See infra notes 137-155 and accompanying text.
14 "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Morelli, 643 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3143 (1981); United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3109 (1981); United States
v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United
States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d
352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Parness, 503
F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Chovanec,
467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975), appeal dismissed,
556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
116 See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Amato, 367 F.
Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
117 "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy clause "establishes three distinct
protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2)
against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; (3) against multiple
punishments for the same offense." United States v. Brooklier, 637 F.2d 620, 621, (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1514 (1981).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 677 (1980); United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 91 (1979); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978). See generally Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959) and Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) where the doctrine of dual sovereignty
is reaffirmed.
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are used to establish a racketeering pattern, the Blockburger test 19 has
been applied to uphold the validity of prosecutions for both RICO and the
predicate federal offenses. 2 '
Because criminal acts committed before its effective date may, under
the definition stated in section 1961(5),"' be employed by the prosecution
in proving the element of a pattern of racketeering activity, RICO has been
attacked as an ex post facto law. 2 ' But, section 1961(5) was drafted to
avoid the ex post facto prohibition by requiring that at least one of the two
or more requisite predicate offenses be committed after RICO's effective
date, and the courts have not construed RICO as an ex post facto law."'
Another argument often made in conjunction with the ex post facto
claim is that RICO is used to circumvent the applicable state or federal
statute of limitations. 5 Courts have found that even where state offenses
form the pattern of racketeering, it is the federal rather than the state
statute of limitations that applies.' The main reasons supporting this posi-
119 Regarding double jeopardy "[t]he applicable rule is that, where the same act or trans-
action constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dean,
647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1981); United
States v. DeVincent, 632 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d
308 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).
221 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976). See supra note 11, for text.
1 22 Ex post facto laws are prohibited by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
An ex post facto law is one which "makes an action done before the passing of the law,
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes the action," or which "aggravates
a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed," or which "changes the
punishment, and inflicts greater punishment, then the law annexed to the crime, when
committed".
United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).
123 Any person who had committed any act(s) of racketeering activity prior to the effective
date would be "on notice that the commission of a further such act within the prohibition
of the Statute will subject him to liability for a new offense," and "this is all that the
ex post facto clause requires." United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
124See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976), rehearing
denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
affd mem. 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
125See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836
(1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Field,
432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
439 U.S. 801 (1978).
1 26 See United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978);
United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977). The federal statute of limitations
applicable in non-capital cases is 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976). It provides a limitation period
of five years.
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tion are: (1) the state offenses are used for definition only and it is not
necessary that the state still be able to prosecute the offenders at the time
the RICO charge is made," 7 and (2) any other result would lead to un-
equal enforcement of federal law. 1 8 One problem remains because the
courts have held that only the last predicate offense must be committed
within the five-year limitation period.'29 Any of the others may have been com-
mitted at any time before, so long as the period between any of these previous
racketeering acts is no greater than ten years."' Theoretically, the pattern
could extend back in time without limitation, so long as the ten-year interval
is never exceeded. This may not be consistent with the purpose of the statute
of limitations,' 3' and the A.B.A. recommends amending RICO to require
that all the racketeering acts occur within the existing five-year limitation
period.'
Finally, several aspects of RICO have been alleged to violate the con-
stitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment'33 because sentences for
RICO offenses can exceed the aggregate of sentences for the predicate of-
fense and all sentences may run consecutively. However, the courts have
held that this is permissible.' American dislike for in personam forfeiture 35
has led to attack on section 1963(a), but the courts have also upheld it
against charges of cruel and unusual punishment. 38
Although attacked under many different constitutional provisions,
RICO to date has survived every challenge. RICO's constitutionality may
seem even more extraordinary after considering the discussion of some of
RICO's more intricate elements.
127See United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1072 (1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
228 If each of the states applied their own limitations period, it would inevitably lead to
claims of denial of equal protection and violation of due process, plus leading to uncertain
application of federal law.
1
2 9 See United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd mem., 578
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
30SSee text of § 1961(5), supra note 11.
a'aAccording to the Supreme Court the policies served by statutes of limitation are: (1)
protecting individuals against prosecution for acts which occurred so long ago in time
that the person can no longer compile evidence for himself to rebut the charge, and (2)
encouraging prompt investigation by law enforcement officials of suspected criminal ac-
tivity. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970).
ls2Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 22, at 4-5. This would allow prosecution
under RICO and for the predicate offenses in every case where federal crimes were used
as the pattern of racketeering activity.
233 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
134See, e.g., United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
3143 (1981); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 1345 (1980).
13 5 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
"'See, e.g., United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct
98 (1981); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
1312 (1980); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
COMMENTS
15
Morris: RICO
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
AKRON LAW REVIEW
V. SELECTED RICO ELEMENTS
The courts have said that "the 'enterprise' element stands as the focal
point of the [RICO] offense."' 37 The scope and meaning of "enterprise"
under section 1961(4)138 has been discussed at length by the courts,3 9 with
controversy centered mainly on two questions. First, does section 1961(4)
include entirely illegitimate associations and entities, or is it limited to
legitimate activities? Second, what, if any, governmental or public entities
can be a RICO enterprise?
The recent Supreme Court decision, United States v. Turkette,"' ° set-
tled two ambiguities concerning the RICO element of enterprise. Turkette
held that "enterprise" is a separate element of a RICO offense, distinct
from a "pattern of racketeering activity,""" which must be proven as part
of the prosecution's case-in-chief. 12 Turkette also finally resolved a long-
standing question by holding that illegitimate and illicit associations and
entities are included within the RICO "enterprise" concept. "3 Thus, section
1962(c)"' can be expanded for use against illicit activities, e.g., arson-for-
profit rings, "' narcotics operations,'" illegal gambling networks,' and
other illicit activities, " 8 making RICO a formidable prosecution weapon
against all types of organized criminal activity of whatever nature.
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the second major question,
the courts of appeals have pretty well settled what public entities fall within
RICO's "enterprise" definition. Such diverse entities as county sheriff's
187United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 1351 (1981).
Ma 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). See supra note 12 for text.
139 See United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., 652 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 nn.8 & 9 (7th
Cir. 1981) (collecting "enterprise" cases from the courts of appeals).
140 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
2411 d. at 2528. This was previously an ambiguous question, see e.g., United States v. Stratton,
649 F.2d 1066, 1075 (5th Cir. 1981).
242 101 S. Ct. at 2529.
143 Id. at 2527-34.
144 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). See supra note 65 for text.
245 United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
140 United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981).
47 United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 1015 S. CL 3142
(1981).
148 United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., 100
S. Ct. 1345 (1980) (association for robbery, contract murder); United States v. Elliott, 571
F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (car theft fencing stolen
property, murder); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1020 (1978) (prostitution ring).
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offices,'49 police departments,' court districts,' 5' and other state offices...
have been included in RICO enterprises. Thus, an "enterprise" can consist
of legitimate or illegitimate entities, and may include public as well as
private entities.
Another key element in a RICO prosecution is the "pattern of racket-
eering activity."' 53 It is clear that at least two acts of "racketeering activity"
are required, but some questions still arise under section 1961(5). Primarily,
must the acts of racketeering be related to one another in order to form a
pattern? Some courts have found a need for a common plan or scheme,
based on their reading of RICO's legislative history.' However, the majority
position requires only that the acts be related to the enterprise itself and
not necessarily to one another.'
Related to the "pattern" question is the uncertainty United States v.
Dean" created as to the correct definition of a RICO count. Until the Dean
decision, RICO counts had been apparently based on the number of enter-
prises involved with numerous racketeering acts making up the requisite
pattern." 7 Dean, used instead the number of patterns to determine the prop-
er number of RICO counts. In doing so, Dean used a conspiracy law analogy
149E.g., United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Baker, 617
F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980).
5oUnited States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978);
United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152
(1980).
'
51 E.g., United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981) (third judicial district in
Florida, including judges, attorneys, etc.).
152The early case of United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), affld in
part 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980, 1976), was the only
case to reject the notion that RICO enterprise extended to state government. The Mandel
case has since been criticized by the 4th Cir. in an opinion indicating Mandel should not be
followed. United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-281).
153 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976). See supra note 11 for text.
"54 See, e.g., United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977); United States v. Scalzitti,
408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Wis.
1974); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff d mer., 527 F.2d
237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). The requirement of common scheme
or plan could also serve as a substitute for any RICO mens rea element, as common
schemes or plans would necessarily involve knowing participation by the offenders.
'55 See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 209 (1980); United States
v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 439 U.S. 953 (1978);
United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978);
United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
X55647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981).
157See, e.g., United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981) (several arsons and
murder made up single pattern); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.
1981) (judge, attorneys engaged in acts of bribery, manipulation of jurors all one pattern).
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to determine what constituted a distinct pattern. 5 ' This both narrows and
expands RICO's reach. In using the number of patterns as the measure for
the number of counts possible, Dean greatly expands RICO's reach. How-
ever, if these patterns are determined through use of a formula that con-
siders interrelatedness of the acts, then liability will be narrowed. This
will be the next area of controversy under RICO, replacing the enterprise
turmoil of the 1970's. Since RICO's primary goal is to address the problem
of "enterprise" criminality, it would seem that the correct measure of a
RICO count should be the number of "enterprises."
VI. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment in 1970 as one of the elements of the Organized
Crime Control Act, RICO has evolved from a particularized weapon aimed
specifically at the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime"9
into a multipotent prosecution tool increasingly employed by the federal
government against many varied types of organized criminal activity." °
This increased use has spurred interest in RICO, and after two years of
study the A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice Committee on Prosecution
and Defense of RICO Cases has issued a report recommending several
amendments to the present RICO statute.'.. These proposed amendments
are an attempt to fine-tune RICO to insure its fair application without im-
pairing its effectiveness. The merits of all the Committee proposals will
be thoroughly debated when the report is presented to the A.B.A. House
of Delegates for approval later this year, but a few of the more important
changes proposed have been discussed in this comment. 2 These proposals
deserve serious consideration, especially by any state contemplating enact-
ment of a RICO statute at some time in the future. 6
Several states have already adopted RICO statutes modeled on the
158 647 F.2d at 786-88. Dean utilizes five factors borrowed from conspiracy law to evaluate
the relation of acts and patterns. These factors are: (1) the time of the acts charged
as making up separate patterns, (2) identity of the persons involved in each of these
acts, (3) the statutory offenses involved, (4) the nature and scope of the activity the
government is seeking to curtail and prosecute, and (5) the places where the acts oc-
curred. 647 F.2d at 788. This focus on pattern expands the possible number of RICO
counts, possibly beyond a tolerable limit. For example, four acts of mail fraud, each act
involving a separte mailing, could result in a two-count indictment using the Dean theory.
159 See, e.g., McClellan, supra note 1, at 141.
160 See, e.g., cases cited at supra notes 19, 145-152.
181 See supra note 22.
162 See supra notes 71, 77, 79, 87-95, 97, 98, 106, 107 and accompanying text.
163 Some of the proposed changes have merit, but it is probable that any change in the
federal RICO statute will only be accomplished as part of the comprehensive reform of the
federal criminal code which Congress has been debating for the last few years. However,
states considering adoption of new laws could decide to include some or all of the A.B.A.
Committee proposals in their new legislation. Instead of modeling existing state or federal
RICO statutes enacted long before the proposed amendments were formulated, those
states currently contemplating new legislation should seriously review the proposed amend-
ments and the rationale supporting them.
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federal RICO act. 64 These states have apparently recognized the advantages
RICO offers to states in need of a tool to fight organized criminal activity.
First, any RICO statute's definition of "racketeering activity" may be formu-
lated with specific local problems in view. 65 Second, a RICO statute can
be easily adapted to deal with novel organized criminal activities as they
arise simply by amending the definition of "racketeering activity" to include
the problem activity. This flexibility in structure enables RICO to ef-
fectively cover organized activity regardless of its precise nature at any
given time. 6' Third, the constitutionality of RICO has been extensively
litigated in the federal courts."' Any state contemplating the adoption
of new legislation to deal with organized crime could adopt a RICO statute
without the usual uncertainty accompanying new legislation regarding its
constitutionality.' 6 Fourth, the courts of a state adopting a RICO statute
would have a considerable body of prior federal court decisions interpret-
ing RICO's provisions upon which to rely for guidance in construing and
applying a state RICO statute modeled on the federal RICO act. Finally,
state prosecutors could turn to federal prosecutors already familiar with the
intricacy and complexity of RICO for technical and practical advice on
RICO prosecutions. This would enable state RICO prosecutions to be
commenced and effectively pursued within a relatively short time after the
enactment of a state RICO statute. RICO therefore offers states several
unique advantages and should be seriously considered by states contem-
plating additional legislation to deal with organized criminal enterprises."'
164 See statutes cited at supra note 20.
165 Compare HAwAn Rnv. STAT. § 842-1 (1976); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911(h) (Pur-
don 1973 & Supp. 1981); and R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-15-1(a) (Supp. 1980) (all defining "rack-
eteering activity" in broad generic terms); with GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3402(a)(1)-(20)
(Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(a)(1)-(21) (Supp. 1981); and IND. CODE ANN. §
35-45-6-1(d) (Burns Supp. 1981) (all defining "racketeering activity" by listing specific
sections of that state's criminal code).
166 As Senator McClellan pointed out, "Members of La Cosa Nostra and smaller organized
crime groups are sufficiently resourceful and enterprising that one constantly is surpised
by the variety of offenses that they commit." McClellan, supra note 1, at 143. Although
speaking only of traditional ethnic "organized crime" groups, Senator McClellan's re-
marks apply equally to any individuals associated for criminal gain, and state statutes should
be flexible enough to deal quickly and efficiently with novel criminal schemes.
217 See supra notes 113-136 and accompanying text.
I" For example, OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.04 (Page 1975), enacted in 1974, established
the offense of engaging in organized crime, a first degree felony. However, this statute was
subsequently declared unconstitutionally vague by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v.
Young, 62 Ohio St. 2d 370, 406 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 281 (1980). Ohio
currently has had no enforceable law dealing directly with organized criminal activity.
Adoption of a statute modeled on RICO could remove uncertainty over constitutionality
of any new legislation.
169 Ohio is now contemplating new legislation to replace the offense declared unconstitu-
tional. H.R. 225, 114th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1981-1982) has already passed the
Ohio House, and is an attempt to revise the language of § 2923.04 to meet the Ohio Supreme
Court's objections. Another bill, S. 361, 114th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1981-1982),
is a RICO-type statute modeled on the federal RICO and on some state RICO laws. Thus,
Ohio is currently facing the situation described in this comment. Hopefully, the Ohio
General Assembly will consider the advantages RICO offers and the merit in that alternative.
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Thus, it should be apparent that RICO statutes hold great promise in
dealing with any type of organized criminal endeavor. State legislatures
especially should note RICO's adaptability, and seriously consider adopting
a RICO statute if organized criminality is a problem within a state. Hope-
fully, this comment will serve as a useful guide for those interested in a
more thorough exploration of RICO.
DAvID E. MoRRis
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